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ROASTING THE PIG TO BURN DOWN THE 
HOUSE: A MODEST PROPOSAL
∗
 
STUART MINOR BENJAMIN† 
This essay addresses the question whether one should support 
regulatory proposals that one believes are, standing alone, bad public 
policy in the hope that they will do such harm that they will ultimately 
produce (likely unintended) good results. This question can arise in many 
contexts. If one opposes a certain policy that will sound attractive to 
voters and/or legislators and would be popular in small doses but 
disastrous in large doses, one may decide to support the large dose, in the 
hope that people will soon realize their mistake. Or one may regard a set 
of proposed regulations as foolish and likely to hobble the industry 
regulated, but perhaps desirable if one believes that we would be better 
off without that industry. 
I consider this question with respect to spectrum policy. One of the 
major impediments to greater spectrum liberalization is incumbents that 
likely are not the highest and best use of the wireless frequencies 
allocated to them. There is debate as to the desirability of spectrum 
rights for particular entities versus a commons model,1 but there is no 
 
 ∗ With apologies to Jonathan Swift, who is much cleverer than I am. See JONATHAN 
SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL (1729). As for the part before the colon, the Supreme Court 
has frequently noted that some regulations, particularly in the speech context, may have such 
far-reaching negative consequences that they amount to burning the house to roast the pig. 
See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (“The State insists that, by … 
quarantining the general reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and 
women in order to shield juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general 
welfare. Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig.”); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 
604-05 (2002) (“In evaluating the overbreadth of [this] statute, we should be mindful of Justice 
Frankfurter’s admonition not to ‘burn the house to roast the pig.’” (quoting Butler, 352 U.S. at 
383)); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127, 131 (1989) (invoking this 
quotation twice, for good measure); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997) (“In Sable, we 
remarked that the speech restriction … there amounted to ‘burn[ing] the house to roast the 
pig.’” (citation omitted)).  
 † Professor of Law, Duke Law School. 
 1. Compare Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the 
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 287 (1998) (envisioning new 
networks that largely avoid interference, and contending that such networks will not be created 
by private actors, such that the most economically efficient option is for the government to 
create a wireless commons), with Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice 
Between Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007 (2003) (noting that either the 
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real debate that our current system of spectrum rights keeps some lower-
valued uses on wireless frequencies at the expense of higher-valued uses. 
This phenomenon flows from legal restrictions on the services that 
licensees can offer. Most existing licensees are permitted to offer a small 
number of services. Other services might be more valuable, but they are 
not allowed to provide them.2 
Unsurprisingly, incumbents push for greater flexibility in the 
services they can offer (and, ideally, the ability to subdivide and sell or 
lease their spectrum rights). But while incumbents want greater 
flexibility, what they resist mightily (and understandably) is any change 
in spectrum policy that would reduce or eliminate their spectrum rights. 
Meanwhile, the general public has an interest in spectrum rights being 
devoted to their highest valued uses. That could be achieved by giving 
incumbents greater flexibility. But if such flexibility seems politically 
unpalatable, another way of moving to higher valued uses would be for 
the government to reallocate spectrum to new uses that the public would 
value more highly. And a simple way of achieving that would be to 
reclaim spectrum devoted to lower valued uses from the existing 
licensees, to allocate it to higher valued uses, and then to distribute 
(ideally, via auction3) spectrum rights to a new set of licensees. 
This last idea alarms incumbents, for the obvious reason that they 
would lose something of value. And, as it turns out, incumbents have 
been successful in opposing any large-scale changes in spectrum 
allocation. The main reason for their success is that the wealth they 
derive from their control of valuable frequencies not only gives them an 
incentive to hold onto that spectrum but also gives them the funds to be 
effective lobbyists. Indeed, lobbyists for spectrum incumbents have done 
a good job of framing the issue. They have argued against possible 
changes to spectrum allocation by questioning why the government is 
trying to get rid of them. This line of argument privileges the status quo, 
of course—that is its essence, and purpose. The result is that the hurdles 
to changes in spectrum allocation are considerable. There have been 
 
government or a private party will have to create protocols for the proposed networks, that 
private actors will create these networks if they are as attractive as Benkler suggests, and that 
the disadvantages of private control are outweighed by the disadvantages of public control). 
 2. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment 
Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1 (2002). 
 3. The literature on auctions is immense. There are tradeoffs involved, but the 
consensus is that, among methods of assigning licenses to particular licensees, auctions are the 
best option. See, e.g., Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum 
Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 87, 107-08 (1997); Pablo T. Spiller & 
Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON 
REG. 53 (1999); Evan Kwerel & Alex D. Felker, Using Auctions to Select FCC Licensees (FCC 
Off. of Plans and Pol’y, Working Paper No. 16, 1985), 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp16.pdf. 
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changes in spectrum allocation, and changes will continue to occur, but 
what is remarkable is how little change there has been. 
This matters a great deal to information policy. Simply stated, 
creating new wireless services, expanding existing valuable wireless 
services, and experimenting with spectrum commons are made more 
difficult by the paucity of available spectrum. 
In looking at current users of spectrum, two big ones jump out—
over-the-air television broadcasting and government. For decades, 
broadcasting was the central use of spectrum, and the only one that was 
widely profitable. That has changed with the rise of wireless services like 
cellular telephony and the rise of alternatives to broadcast for the receipt 
of television signals, in the form of cable and satellite television. I have 
written elsewhere about the desirability of moving all, or at least most, 
over-the-air television broadcasting off the spectrum, and I will not 
belabor those arguments here.4 But a few points bear emphasizing. First, 
86% of American households subscribe to cable or satellite.5 Second, the 
main advantage of transmission via spectrum versus transmission via wire  
—mobility—is largely inapplicable to broadcast television. The 
percentage of televisions that are in motion, watching over-the-air 
broadcast signals, and unable to access other means of receiving those 
signals (such as satellite) is tiny. To put the point differently, very few 
people watch broadcast television in a moving vehicle that does not have 
satellite reception. Third, television broadcasting occupies hundreds of 
megahertz of “prime beachfront” spectrum—frequencies that can be 
utilized for a wide range of uses, including many forms of point-to-point 
communication. The value of that spectrum is enormous. The revenue 
generated by selling the spectrum would depend on auction prices, of 
course, but the estimated range is in the hundreds of billions of dollars.6 
And because service providers could not capture all the value of the 
spectrum, the value to citizens—the consumer surplus created by the new 
 
 4. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating the Federal Communications Commission’s 
National Television Ownership Cap: What’s Bad for Broadcasting Is Good for the Country, 46 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 439 (2004). 
 5. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video 
Programming, Annual Report, 21 FCC Rcd. 2503, app. B, tbl. B-1 (2006). 
 6. See Evan R. Kwerel & John R. Williams, Changing Channels: Voluntary 
Reallocation of UHF Television Spectrum vii (FCC Off. of Plans & Pol’y Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 27, 1992), 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp27.pdf. Another estimate of the 
auction value of the broadcast spectrum, based on the auctions for spectrum for third 
generation wireless services, is $367 billion. See Michael Calabrese, Battle Over the Airwaves: 
Principles for Spectrum Policy Reform 4 (New Am. Found., Working Paper, 2001); Thomas 
Lenard, No More Delays on Digital TV, C|NET, May 4, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/2010-
1040-5203382.html. 
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services—would far exceed the auction revenue.7 
There would be costs to ending television broadcasting. One of 
these need not (and likely would not) be the demise of the companies 
that currently produce broadcasting, or a diminution in their 
programming. As I discussed in an earlier article, the very likely result 
would be that broadcasters would become cable and satellite channels 
alongside the existing cable and satellite channels—which is the status 
that broadcasters already occupy for the 86% of homes that rely on cable 
or satellite.8 But there would be a cost in the form of the dislocation of 
those who rely on broadcast television and cannot afford the alternatives. 
There is, however, a fairly easy way to shift this cost to the government 
for those people who are too poor to afford cable or satellite: the 
government could pay for satellite dishes or cable hook-ups and a basic 
set of channels (slightly better than those individuals were getting via 
broadcast) for less than $10 billion.9 Simply stated, the costs of 
subsidizing cable or satellite service for the 14% of households that do 
not subscribe to cable or satellite but want television service would be a 
small fraction of the value of broadcast frequencies, as reflected in the 
value of those frequencies at auction once they could be used for any 
service.10 
It is possible that broadcasting is the highest and best use of some of 
the spectrum, and thus that at least some spectrum licensees that could 
offer any service would still choose to offer broadcast. That is not an 
argument in favor of keeping so much spectrum devoted to broadcasting, 
however: we should still leave the choice to spectrum licensees, so that 
they can make their own determinations about the highest valued use of 
their spectrum—whether broadcast or otherwise. But this does 
underscore the fact that when I talk about the demise of broadcasting, I 
am doing so on the assumption that broadcast is not the highest valued 
use of the spectrum. My real complaint, though, is not with broadcasting 
per se, but with spectrum allocation rules that prohibit flexibility in the 
use of the broadcast spectrum. 
In any event, even if broadcasting is the highest valued use of at 
least a portion of the spectrum, that will almost certainly end soon. The 
value of spectrum for over-the-air broadcasting will decrease as a result of 
two basic trends: first, the percentage of households relying on over-the-
 
 7. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The U.S. Digital TV Transition: Time to Toss the Negroponte 
Switch 21 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Studies, Working Paper No. 01-15, 2001) 
(stating that the annual consumer surplus from new wireless services on broadcast spectrum 
could be as high as the total auction bids). 
 8. See Benjamin, supra note 4, at 496.  
 9. See id.; Hazlett, supra note 7, at 16. 
 10. See Benjamin, supra note 4, at 497-98. 
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air broadcast will likely continue to decrease, as people subscribe to cable 
or satellite; second, the percentage of people watching traditional over-
the-air networks will almost certainly decrease, continuing a steady 
decline that began more than 30 years ago.11 Indeed, the interesting 
question for the future is what percentage of users will move away from 
television networks (whether broadcast or cable/satellite) toward other 
forms of entertainment, thus accelerating the decline of broadcast. That 
is, broadcast has long been receiving a declining share of television 
viewership, but this may combine with sharp declines in television 
viewership overall to really hurt broadcasting. All these forces will, I 
think, ultimately lead the holders of spectrum licenses for broadcast to 
conclude that there are higher and better non-broadcast uses of their 
spectrum rights. 
If the above is correct, then the government could simply allow 
broadcasters to offer any service on their spectrum (and subdivide and 
lease their spectrum to third parties as they see fit), and broadcasters 
would likely move away from over-the-air broadcast and to new services. 
The value of other services on frequencies currently devoted to 
broadcasting would be so high (and so much higher than the value of 
broadcasting) that an entity free to offer any service would choose 
something other than broadcasting, and make billions of dollars doing 
it.12 This would be an enormous windfall for broadcasters (and, 
concomitantly, deprive the government of revenues that it would receive 
if it auctioned those frequencies), but perhaps that is a price worth paying 
to free up the spectrum. 
For better or worse, such a complete opening of broadcast spectrum 
to other uses is unlikely to occur. Even more unlikely is the prospect that, 
in the next few years, Congress will force broadcasting off the spectrum. 
I think it is likely that broadcasting will shrivel, and thus leave the 
spectrum, in 20 years. But that is a long time to wait. 
This sets up the question for this essay: does it make sense to 
support broadcast regulations that seem undesirable on their own terms 
but that may result in such harms to broadcasting that broadcasting 
leaves the spectrum sooner than it otherwise would? This question has 
particular salience in light of the Federal Communications Commission’s 
 
 11. See Benjamin, supra note 4, at 482 (“In the 1970s, over 90% of viewers watched one 
of the then-three major broadcast television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC). Since that 
time, cable and satellite television have changed the television landscape dramatically. The 
broadcast networks’ share of television viewers has steadily declined as the cable channels’ share 
has increased. In fact, cable channels now have a majority of the audience share: the now-seven 
broadcast networks combined garner less than a 50% share of hours viewed.”). 
 12. And in the unlikely event that they freely chose to offer broadcasting on at least some 
of their frequencies, we would know they were doing so because they concluded that this was 
its highest valued use, not because the government’s allocation rules deprived them of options. 
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January 2008 Report on Broadcast Localism13 that would effectively require 
broadcasters to provide locally-oriented programming and to comply 
with new administrative regulations (including advisory boards 
reminiscent of the ascertainment requirements that the Commission 
jettisoned in 198414) that could prove fairly costly. But the larger 
question involves a host of proposals that would raise broadcasters’ costs 
or reduce their potential income. Should we welcome new regulations on 
broadcasters that will make broadcasting unprofitable? 
My contrarian take is that the answer will often be “yes.” Some 
regulations that would be undesirable standing on their own will be 
desirable once we factor in the degree to which they will hasten the 
demise of over-the-air broadcasting. 
It is worth emphasizing that I am not talking about regulations that 
impose costs but have even greater benefits on their own terms, because 
such regulations are desirable in their own right. My focus here is on 
regulations that have greater costs than benefits when considered in 
isolation, but which are ultimately desirable because they have the added 
benefit of leading broadcasting’s frequencies to be opened up sooner. 
Some such regulations will, on their own terms, be near-misses in terms 
of a benefit/cost analysis. That is, they will have benefits, by leading to 
better programming or to some non-programming benefit (e.g., a more 
fair distribution of society’s resources), but those benefits will be 
outweighed by their costs. Some regulations will impose costs and have 
no benefits because they are ineffectual. Finally, some regulations will 
impose costs on broadcasters and not only have no benefits but also 
impose additional costs in their effects (e.g., make programming worse). 
My point in this essay is that the benefit of pushing broadcasting off the 
spectrum may transform many of these regulations into desirable ones. 
This highlights a very important consideration: if a regulation 
would tend to entrench broadcasting’s place on the spectrum, then the 
regulation will not help to free up the spectrum and should be avoided. 
Hurting broadcasters is simply a means towards the goal of opening up 
wireless frequencies, so a regulation that frustrates this goal hurts 
broadcasters without achieving any countervailing benefit. The form of 
entrenchment to which I am referring is regulations that increase the 
benefits to government officials of having over-the-air broadcasting. This 
is a straightforward principal/agent problem. Government officials (and 
in particular members of Congress) have reasons to want to preserve 
 
 13. Broad. Localism, Report & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 FCC Rcd. 1324 (2008); 
see also Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast 
Licensee Public Interest Obligations, Report & Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 1274 (2008). 
 14.  Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Report & Order, 98 
F.C.C.2d 1075, ¶ 45 (1984). 
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broadcast television that have nothing to do with what their constituents 
want.15 The lifeblood for elected officials—and one of the biggest 
advantages of incumbency—is free advertising, for example coverage of 
an official’s visits to local community events.16 The easiest and most 
effective way for members of Congress to reach their constituents 
without having to pay for advertising is to appear at a community event 
that is covered by the local television station. Constituents have little 
reason to value this coverage, but politicians do.17 Because the interests of 
government representatives and their constituents are not aligned in this 
respect, we have reason to expect that government actors will aim to 
protect broadcast television beyond what their constituents would want.18 
Indeed, the history of broadcast regulation is characterized by coziness 
between government actors and incumbent broadcasters.19 This has led 
to government policies that have created barriers to entry for potential 
competitors and given valuable goodies to broadcasters.20 
The possibility of entrenchment suggests a classification scheme for 
broadcast regulations that impose costs and/or reduce revenues: We 
should look to see what impact, if any, the regulations would have on 
broadcasters’ behavior, and what impact they would have on government 
officials’ desire to keep broadcasting alive because broadcasting benefited 
them. 
Some specific applications will help to flesh this out and to illustrate 
the degree to which these considerations can point in different 
directions. Many people would regard free airtime for political candidates 
 
 15. See Charles Platt, The Great HDTV Swindle, WIRED, Feb. 1997, at 57 (“So long as 
broadcasting is protected from the free market by legislators who depend on TV to get 
themselves reelected, Congress will continue giving broadcasters special treatment and favors, 
and consumers will suffer.”). 
 16. See Mark Tushnet et al., Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66 
TEX. L. REV. 967, 973 (1988) (stating that incumbents are generally better known than 
challengers because of free advertising, including local television coverage of the incumbent). 
 17. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Chief Talks of Frustration and Surprise, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at C6 (noting that local broadcasters “have considerable influence 
because they are in every Congressional district and control most of the television and radio 
outlets that are vital to political life....”). 
 18. Polling regarding the national ownership cap supports this point. See Matthew Rose, 
TV Networks Join Forces to Fight Backlash over Station Ownership, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2003, 
at A1 (noting a survey showing “that only 11% [of respondents] believe network ownership of 
their local station is a bad thing and 68% think the market should decide whether that should 
happen or not” and quoting a pollster as saying “I have never seen a situation where politicians 
have a greater disconnect from the people they represent”). 
 19. See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING 
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING (1994). 
 20. See Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to 
Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 62-63 (1999) (suggesting that “regulators’ 
real interest in perpetuating the existing spectrum administration stems from their desire to 
maintain the steady flow of political rents generated by control over spectrum.”). 
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as a positive change in programming.21 It would also be costly for 
broadcasters, and if the costs were high enough it would satisfy the 
criterion of having costs exceeding its benefits. But it is also likely to 
exacerbate the principal/agent problem, as it would lead politicians to 
become even more desirous of keeping broadcasting alive than they 
already are. Thus beyond its benefit/cost ratio standing alone, it would 
have the additional cost of making broadcasters’ continued use of the 
spectrum more, rather than less, likely – a step in the wrong direction. 
The same might be the case for the revival of the personal attack 
and political editorial rules.22 Incumbents know that their incumbency 
entails a huge advantage (incumbent re-election rates for the House have 
averaged 95% since 1990), and so they likely regard the personal attack 
and political editorial rules as a net benefit.23 Yes, this means that their 
opponents will have equal time if attacked. But it also means that the 
incumbent can respond to an attack, and a sharp attack on a politician is 
one of the relatively few phenomena that can significantly change the 
dynamics of a political race. Since the incumbent starts as the 
presumptive winner of a given election, defanging such a game-changing 
possibility should benefit an incumbent more often than it hurts her. So 
the imposition of personal attack and political editorial rules might 
further entrench over-the-air broadcasting, creating an additional cost of 
such a regulation. 
One possible objection to my proposal is that there might be some 
regulations that are so inefficient that the prospect of hastening the 
departure of broadcasting from the airwaves will not be sufficient to 
justify them. After all, my point is that the demise of over-the-air 
broadcasting is a benefit that should enter into our regulatory calculus, 
but there is no guarantee that that benefit will outweigh the cost of a 
regulation that would otherwise be deadweight loss. My answer is that 
 
 21. See, e.g., CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, BEYOND THE 30-SECOND SPOT: 
ENHANCING THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS 42-65 (1988); JOHN 
ELLIS, NINE SUNDAYS 18 (1991); NEWTON N. MINOW ET AL., PRESIDENTIAL 
TELEVISION 159-66 (1973); Reed E. Hundt, The Public’s Airwaves: What Does the Public 
Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1100-09 (1996). 
 22. These were rules mandating that broadcasters provide airtime for responses to any 
“personal attacks” or “political editorials” that they broadcast. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (rejecting a First Amendment attack on the personal attack and 
political editorial rules); STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 
AND POLICY 224-227 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the “tortured path” of ultimately successful 
attempts to repeal these rules). 
 23. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Reelection Rates Over the Years, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php?cycle=2006 (showing that the incumbent 
reelection rate for the House of Representatives since 1990 has been 95% (and the average has 
been below 96% in only one of the last five election cycles), whereas Senate reelection rates 
since 1990 have been a comparatively low 88%). 
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we should expect a linear relationship between costs imposed on 
broadcasters and the likelihood of them abandoning over-the-air 
broadcasting. Every dollar of additional costs for broadcasters is one less 
dollar of profit, and thus reduces the attractiveness of over-the-air 
broadcasting as a business model. And don’t forget the pot of gold at the 
end of the rainbow: once broadcasting leaves the spectrum, much more 
valuable services can utilize those frequencies. 
This does suggest one last element of desirably inefficient 
regulation: it should impose costs on broadcasters but be inexpensive for 
the government to administer. Government costs are not only 
deadweight losses but also do not hasten the demise of broadcasting 
(except insofar as they lead some regulators to want to push broadcasting 
off the spectrum to eliminate those government costs – an incentive in 
which we can have little confidence, given the fact that government 
regulators do not bear those costs). So the most desirable form of 
regulation is one that does not exacerbate the principal/agent problem 
and imposes significant costs on broadcasters but not on the government. 
Where should this lead us, in terms of broadcast regulation? The 
most obviously desirable regulations are probably those that are pure 
deadweight loss—regulations that cost broadcasters significant amounts 
of money but have no impact on their behavior. This category would 
include onerous record-keeping requirements, ascertainment 
requirements, etc. These are unlikely to have any impact on 
programming, and thus will likely be pure cost.24 
Regulations that affect broadcasters’ behavior will be trickier, 
because the attractiveness of the change in the broadcaster’s behavior will 
often be in the eye of the beholder. But at least some regulations would 
produce arguably positive changes in broadcasters’ behavior that would 
not seem to increase the principal/agent problem. One example is 
children’s television. The Federal Communications Commission 
effectively requires three hours of children’s programming per week, 
through its processing guidelines.25 Why not increase that to 15 or 25 
hours per week? There will be tons more programming aimed at 
educating children, and it will reduce the viewership of broadcasting and 
thus hasten the demise of broadcasting – what I would regard as a win-
win. 
 
 24. In rejecting the original ascertainment and record-keeping rules, the FCC found that 
those rules had no real impact on programming, and instead were pure costs for broadcasters. 
See The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment 
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Report & 
Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984). 
 25. See Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report & 
Order, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 10,660 (1996). 
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Does this reasoning also apply to allowing uses, users, or licensing 
regimes that one regards as bad public policy onto the spectrum in the 
first place? The answer is no, for the simple reason that the power of 
incumbency is strong. This is due both to the anchoring effect and, more 
importantly, the fact that incumbency creates a constituency that will 
lobby fiercely to keep things as they are. Such lobbying can be such a 
powerful impediment to change that it seems foolhardy to create new 
incumbents in the hope that the decision will be sufficiently disastrous 
that it will overcome the lobbying power of the newly created 
incumbents. 
Do my arguments apply to government spectrum? No, because 
there is a simple, and I believe realistic, way for government officials to 
properly value spectrum and thus use it more efficiently. The incentive 
problem is particularly large for government spectrum: Government 
officials have a great incentive to keep control of as much spectrum as 
possible, and no meaningful incentive to relinquish any of it. And there 
is no obvious future impetus for the government to relinquish. The forces 
at work are fairly straightforward. If government agents are unable to 
communicate effectively over the airwaves at some future critical point, 
the officials in charge of the government’s spectrum will be blamed. 
Imagine the reaction if there were a repeat of the communications 
difficulties that occurred for first responders at the World Trade Center 
after the planes crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001.26 The public would be frustrated, and they would be incensed if 
they heard that a government decision to relinquish some spectrum 
contributed to the problem. Meanwhile, the opportunity cost of 
underutilized spectrum is completely opaque – the public does not 
recognize the costs and government officials have no incentive to 
recognize them. A government official who decides to relinquish some of 
her agency’s spectrum rights receives no rewards. But all of this leads to 
an obvious solution, namely that the opportunity cost of spectrum be 
included in agencies’ budgets, so that government agencies’ consumption 
of spectrum would be as costly to them as their purchase of tangible 
goods. Once we do that, we should expect government officials to use 
spectrum no less efficiently than they use cars, buildings, etc. 
Returning to the focus of this essay, the calculus I am advocating is 
fairly straightforward: when considering the costs and benefits of a given 
regulatory regime, our calculation of the benefits should include the 
hastening of changes in spectrum rights that would create billions of 
 
 26. See Jim Dwyer et al., 9/11 Exposed Deadly Flaws in Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 
2002, at A1; NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 297-311 (2004). 
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dollars in consumer value. There is nothing terribly radical about such a 
calculation. Costs and benefits can take a variety of forms. The point 
here is that what might seem like a cost (the demise of broadcasting) will 
have significant benefits (the transition of the current broadcast spectrum 
to other uses). The result is that regulations that might seem inefficient, 
standing alone, likely will have benefits that exceed their costs once we 
take into consideration the benefit of putting spectrum to a higher valued 
use more quickly. 
Am I serious in writing all this? Not entirely, but mostly. I do think 
that society would benefit if the wireless frequencies currently devoted to 
broadcast could be used for other services, and the first-best ways of 
achieving that goal may not be realistic. I am proposing a second-best – a 
fairly cynical second-best, but a second-best all the same. I would prefer 
not to go down this path, but if that is the only way to hasten the 
shriveling of broadcast’s spectrum usage, then it is probably a path worth 
taking. 
But the larger mission of this essay is to highlight another point – 
namely the mistake entailed in devoting any significant set of wireless 
frequencies to broadcasting. The costs of that devotion are so great that 
they justify, in a benefit/cost analysis, measures that impose deadweight 
losses on broadcasters as a means of pushing broadcasting off the 
spectrum. If that is so, then we should prefer a transition toward greater 
flexibility in spectrum usage without having the considerable costs 
entailed in slowly choking off the profits of over-the-air broadcasting. 
Promulgating regulations that impose deadweight losses will hasten the 
movement of broadcasting off the spectrum, but the process will still take 
years and thus impose prolonged transition costs. If we could transition 
to more valued uses of the spectrum cleanly and quickly, we would be 
better off. We would have the same benefits and lower costs. This 
transition could occur in a way that would make broadcasters very happy 
(conferring value on them by giving them greater flexibility in the 
spectrum usage) or ways that might not make them happy (requiring 
them to pay for greater flexibility and/or assigning their frequencies to 
other users), but any of these outcomes would be preferable to the slow 
transition that inefficient regulations would entail. 
There are some situations in which a slow, measured approach is 
ideal. Spectrum policy is not one of them. Opening up broadcast 
spectrum to other uses will create enormous value. One way or another, 
we need to hasten that process. Spectrum regulators of the world, unite! 
You have nothing to lose but your jobs. 
